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Organizational Dynamics and Adoption of
Innovations: A Study within the Context of Software
Firms in Sri Lanka
by RMU Susantha Udagedara and Kurt Allman
This paper examines the effect of organizational dynamics on innovation focus using the resid-
ual dominant and emergent theoretical framework (RDE) and the empirical evidence of four case
studies. The findings revealed that different types of innovation coexist, but one type becomes dom-
inant over other types at a certain time as the innovation focus is changed in line with the strategic
priorities of firms. We found that innovation focus takes the form of product, process, and organi-
zational innovation pattern over time when the firms move from an entrepreneurial organization
to a more formal business corporation. More importantly, the RDE framework provides an appro-
priate lens for practitioners, in identifying the enablers and barriers of innovation.
Introduction
The value of technology-based entrepreneur-
ial firms (TBEFs) to regional and national devel-
opment, particularly employment and wealth
creation, is acknowledged by many researchers
(Birch 1979, 1987; Kirchhoff 1994; Kirchhoff,
Linton, and Walsh 2013; Kondratieff 1937; Lin-
ton and Walsh 2003; Phillips and Kirchhoff
1989; Schumpeter 1947, 1934; Solow 1956;
Storey 1994; Yanez, Khalil, and Walsh 2010).
The value of entrepreneurial firms to less devel-
oped countries (LDCs) cannot be negated as
they can be more effective as established large
firms despite the lack of capital, technology,
resources, and trading history (Christensen
1997; Kirchhoff 1994). Innovation activities
which are performed by new entrepreneurial
firms are of paramount importance to their sur-
vival (Kondratieff 1937; Mansfield 1968). For
firms operating in LDCs this is particularly cru-
cial as they face more challenges and barriers
than new-TBEFs in developed countries
(Aghion, David, and Foray 2009; Bessant 2003;
Morrison, Pietrobelli, and Rabellotti 2008; Sim-
mons and Sower 2012; Williams and Woodson
2012; Zeschky, Widenmayer, and Gassmann
2011). However, despite these barriers, how
TBEFs in LDCs manage their evolving organiza-
tional capabilities and innovation pipeline when
they grow and mature still remains an over-
looked area in the existing innovation manage-
ment literature. As such, the research question
of this study attempts to shed insight into this
area: How do organizational dynamics affect the
adoption of innovation over the life cycle of a
TBEF in a LDC. Addressing this question ena-
bles an understanding of the effect of organiza-
tional changes on innovation activities of a
TBEF over time.
In this study, organizational dynamics refer
to the changes in a firm over the corporate life
cycle. When an entrepreneurial firm passes from
one stage to another, the characteristics of the
entrepreneurial firm change, introducing new
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managerial challenges, particularly when firms
attempt to adopt new forms of innovation. But
the effect of such changes on innovation is
poorly understood (Koplyay, Chillingworth, and
Mitchell 2013). We therefore examine the effect
of changing organizational characteristics on
innovation, for example, entrepreneurial-
informal organizational form to established and
formalized processes, as organizational dynam-
ics. Such a study is important as the long-term
success of technology-based firms depends on
their ability to manage both external and inter-
nal constraints (Kirchhoff, Linton, and Walsh
2013). Keller (2004) argues that innovation
highly expensive and often depends on environ-
mental, firm specific, or situational factors. As a
result, internal factors such as well-designed and
focused technological efforts, advanced human
capital, and financial resources are some of the
prerequisites which determine the potential suc-
cess of innovation (Fu and Gong 2011; Keller
1996; Lall 1992; Zanello, Fu, and Mohnen 2015).
Many researchers (e.g., Fu and Gong 2011;
Morrison, Pietrobelli, and Rabellotti 2008) argue
that a firm’s ability to adopt innovation by devel-
oping and managing its internal capabilities
determines the long-term success of businesses
in LDCs as unfavorable macro environmental fac-
tors such as a lack of supportive economic poli-
cies, inadequate absorptive capacity of suppliers
and allied industries, poor inter-firm connectivity
and weak labor mobility, a lack of well-
developed national innovation systems, coupled
with weak technology transfer systems act as the
barriers for innovation in LDCs (Fu and Gong
2011; Zanello, Fu, and Mohnen 2015).
Nelson and Winter (1982) state that when
firms invest in capacity building, such invest-
ments enable the introduction of technological
changes and innovation. Moreover, firms in
LDCs can enhance their innovation capacity
through international linkages and other net-
working activities such as exporting and foreign
direct investment opportunities (Altenburg
2006; Barba Navaretti and Venables 2004;
Gereffi and Kaplinsky 2001; Morrison, Pietro-
belli, and Rabellotti 2008; Pietrobelli and Rabel-
lotti 2007). Prahalad and Hamel (1991) noted
that the competences of individuals, good uni-
versities, industry research activities, and other
resources affect the innovative capacity of firms
in LDCs. As such Morrison, Pietrobelli, and
Rabellotti (2008) emphasized the importance of
a theoretical framework to analyze the process
of technological capacity development at the
firm level in LDCs. Yet, research studies that
focus on examining innovation in developing
countries are considerably less in comparison to
the research studies carried in the developed
nations (Kim, Song, and Lee 1993; Morrison,
Pietrobelli, and Rabellotti 2008; Williams and
Woodson 2012). As a result, a considerable
knowledge gap related to innovation in LDCs,
particularly at the firm level, still exists (Bell and
Pavitt 1993; Dantas and Bell 2011; Pietrobelli
and Rabellotti 2011; Tiwari and Herstatt 2012).
Theoretical Background
Innovation
As Marquis (1969) discussed, innovation is
related to the use of a product or process and it
fulfills a specific function, or need. Wheelwright
and Clark (1992) discuss three classes of innova-
tion in new products—incremental, new genera-
tion, and radically new. Yu and Hang (2009)
observed that technological discontinuities often
lead to revolutionary, discontinuous, break-
through, radical, or emergent innovations. A tech-
nology is viewed as disruptive if its applications
create goods or services with new or modified
performance attributes that may require the users
to change their behavior (Bower and Christensen
1995; Walsh 2004). As Kassicieh et al. (2002) and
Anderson and Tushman (1990) discuss, scientific
discoveries often lead to disruptive technologies
or breakthrough innovations that make changes
in existing product or technology paradigms.
Some researchers define innovation based on
the triggers of innovation—technology push and
demand pull (Mowery 1983; Myers and Marquis
1969; Rosenberg 1969). The technology push
perspective is based on the argument that advan-
ces in scientific knowledge determine the
capacity to innovate whereby individual firms
are expected to invest in acquiring scientific
capabilities (Cohen and Levinthal 1990; Mowery
1983). In contrast, researchers who follow the
demand pull perspective, argue that changes in
market conditions determine the firm’s willing-
ness to invest in innovation (Griliches 1957;
Rosenberg 1969; Schmookler 1962; Vernon
1966). Others argue that demand-side stimulus
and technology-side stimulus jointly decide the
success of innovation (Lee 2003) since there is a
strong interrelatedness between technology push
and market pull stimulus (Brem and Voigt 2009;
Burgelman and Sayles 2004).
Historically, though, all types of innovations
cannot be explained only through specific
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market demands or new technologies. Van de
Ven (1986, p. 590) extends these perspectives
through defining innovation as “the develop-
ment and implementation of new ideas by peo-
ple who over time engage in transactions with
others within an institutional order.” This study
also accepts this distinction, embracing Van de
Ven’s definition as it focuses on the innovation
process as well as the outputs of innovation,
since both perspectives are required to fully
investigate the effect of organizational dynamics
on innovation. In this study, types of innovation
are, therefore, viewed as the output of the inno-
vation process following the Van de Ven’s
definition.
Schumpeter (1934) discusses the types of
innovation based on the kind of object change.
Following his views, Varis and Littunen (2010)
differentiate the types of innovations as product,
process, marketing, and organizational innova-
tions. A product innovation refers to a new
product or a differentiated product (OECD
2005; Tavassoli and Karlssonb 2015; Varis and
Littunen 2010), which also can be a new tech-
nology or combination of technologies intro-
duced commercially to meet a user or a market
need (Utterback and Abernathy 1975). This sug-
gests that a product innovation can be sold to a
customer when manufactured. A process inno-
vation is defined as the introduction of new
methods of production which involves the
reduction of the costs, preserving or increasing
the quality of the product produced, resulting in
significant changes in techniques, equipment,
and/or software(OECD 2005; Tavassoli and
Karlssonb 2015; Varis and Littunen 2010). This
suggests that process innovations change pro-
cess equipment, workforce, task specifications,
material inputs, work, and information flows as
discussed by Utterback and Abernathy (1975).
As Linton and Walsh (2003) highlighted, process
technologies can be used to make or improve
other technologies and process innovations sig-
nificantly change or modify the end product fea-
tures. Organizational innovation refers to the
changing routines of firms, improving the effi-
ciency, productivity, or implementation of a
new organizational method in the firm’s busi-
ness practices, workplace organization, or exter-
nal relations (OECD 2005; Tavassoli and
Karlssonb 2015; Varis and Littunen 2010)
wherein organizational innovation can change
or improve the management practices or organi-
zational structure. Conversely, marketing inno-
vation, which is aimed at the implementation of
a new marketing method involving significant
changes in product design or packaging, prod-
uct placement, product promotion or pricing
(OECD 2005; Tavassoli and Karlssonb 2015;
Varis and Littunen 2010), introduces the signifi-
cant changes in the marketing practices.
Innovation Adoption in Technology-
Based Firms
Marquis (1969) observed that each firm has
its own innovation pathway which is connected
to the disruptive or sustaining nature of the tech-
nologies the firm uses and its interest for market
pull verses technology push innovation strat-
egies. Bower and Christensen (1995) argue that
large firms often prefer to sustain technologies
that assist in continuous innovation, rather than
disruptive technologies that can create discontin-
uous innovations. Although disruptive technolo-
gies can create more opportunities for entry into
existing and the new markets, the associated
risk of failure is also high due to customer resist-
ance and rapidly changing technological envi-
ronment wherein large firms are less interested
in investing for disruptive technologies as the
commercialization of disruptive technologies can
be highly expensive and risky (Walsh, Kirchhoff,
and Newbert 2002). On the contrary, small firms
are interested in disruptive technologies and dis-
continuous innovation to acquire competitive
advantages as they struggle to challenge the sta-
tus quo of reputation, scale economies, and
sunk investments (Mansfield 1968).
By presenting the technology evolution
model, Anderson and Tushman’s (1990) illus-
trated how and when technological discontinu-
ities emerge, and contrast social and technology
dynamics during the period of ferment and
incremental innovations. As they state, techno-
logical discontinuities often lead to a dominant
technology design followed by a period of fer-
ment. During the era of ferment, firms start to
introduce various product classes due to the
increasing rivalry among firms until a dominant
design establishes, which later becomes the
industry standard. After a dominant design
establishes, various incremental innovations
emerge and persist until the next breakthrough
innovation take place (Anderson and Tushman
1990; Myers and Marquis 1969).
Following Schumpeter’s “creative destruction”
logic, Winter (1984) argues that new firms widen
the radical innovation activities of an industry
through the sources of knowledge, which often
exist outside the established routes. In the early
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stages, new start-ups tend to follow multiple
technology trajectories since the best technology
that can satisfy its users, is unknown to them
(Dosi 1982). Hence, they act as the change
agents that create new industrial waves (Gort
and Klepper 1982). As Klepper (1996) identified,
new firms attempt to establish themselves in the
industry by introducing product innovations. If
they can successfully pass this stage, they enter
the next regime, which is known as the routi-
nized stage (Winter 1984) where established
new entrants prefer to rely on existing hierar-
chies, knowledge, market information, distribu-
tion channels and depend on the internalized
market-based expertise for innovation (Gort and
Klepper 1982; Nelson and Winter 1982). Low
start-up costs in the early stages of a new indus-
try order allow new firms to easily enter, how-
ever, this situation is later changed when the
technological regime increases entry barriers and
rewards previous sunk investments.
Although firms focus on product innovation
in the early period, later, they focus on reducing
cost and increasing efficiency by introducing
process innovations as the market becomes
more price sensitive at the later stages (Klepper
1996). When the industry becomes mature, new
entrants and variation of product classes gradu-
ally disappear and a dominant design estab-
lishes in the industry. Only firms that are
capable of reducing cost and increasing efficien-
cies survive when a few large firms dominate in
the industry and enjoy economies of scale and
reputation (Klepper 1996). As Pyka (2000)
states, although a very high level of technologi-
cal uncertainty and a strong emphasis on prod-
uct innovation can be seen in the early stages,
later, when demand increases, firms introduce
more incremental innovations and the focus
shifts from the product to process innovations
to meet the customer demand and increasing
sophistication, and also to reduce the associated
cost of production (Herrmann 2005). Foster
(1986) observed that technology progression
passes several stages: slow advancement, accel-
eration, and declining which is similar to the
general form of an S-curve. However, these
studies have paid less attention to analyzing the
effects of organizational evolution on technol-
ogy evolution.
Life Cycle in Innovation Models
The basis of firm evolution and innovation
dynamics often lies in the business life cycle lit-
erature as these theories explain changes in a
firm over time (Greiner 1972; Justis 1981; Quinn
and Cameron 1983). Researchers (Barras 1990;
Damanpour and Gopalakrishnan 2001; Koplyay,
Chillingworth, and Mitchell 2013; Tidd and
Bessant 2011; Utterback 1994; Utterback and
Abernathy 1975) have identified that the pattern
of innovation adoption and the relative impor-
tance of innovation determinants change over
the industry’s life cycle (Dao and Zmud 2013;
Tavassoli 2015). Based on life cycle theories,
Utterback and Abernathy (1975) found that the
product-process innovation pattern is more
common in business by analyzing data from five
different industries. Barras (1990) observed that
the types of innovation adoption follow a pat-
tern of process–product pattern in services.
Later Koplyay, Chillingworth, and Mitchell
(2013) argue that product, marketing, process,
and finance innovation adoption pattern is com-
mon in businesses.
In their model, Utterback and Abernathy
(1975) highlight three development phases in
respect to innovations, entitled: fluid, transi-
tional, and specific. The fluid phase is character-
ized by uncertainty and the main emphasis is on
product innovations. During the transitional
phase, process innovation becomes the key
emphasis followed by market acceptance and
the dominant design wherein product innova-
tions start to decline as firms have to choose
between product and process innovation efforts.
Later, firms focus on producing very specific
products more efficiently and attempt to moni-
tor and control both the product and process
innovations (Utterback and Abernathy 1975).
Adner and Levinthal (2001) also found that
firms attempt to meet the minimum thresholds
of performance in the early period of the life
cycle wherein the key emphasis is placed on
product innovation. This emphasis shifts to the
process innovation later on, when the industry
becomes more price sensitive. Linton and Walsh
(2008), however, argue that a similar pattern,
which is discussed by Utterback and Abernathy
(1975), is not identical to all industries and
products. Especially, related to the material-
based products, both product and process inno-
vations often take place simultaneously as the
changes in the process generally modify the
product (Linton and Walsh 2003).
Organization Life Cycle and Innovation
Characteristics
The life cycle studies, to some extent, assist
in understanding the changing nature of
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organizations over time, although they do not
provide a strong basis for analyzing the effect of
organizational dynamics on innovations due to
their unrealistic assumptions and inconsistent
findings. For instance, Quinn and Cameron
(1983) presented a four-stage model to explain
the organizational evolution over time when
others (Lester and Parnell 1999; Lester, Parnell,
and Carraher 2003) describe the organizational
evolution with a five-stage model. According to
most researchers, stage one is referred to as the
“existence” (Churchill and Lewis 1983) or entre-
preneurial stage (Quinn and Cameron 1983) or
birth stage (Lippitt and Schmidt 1967), and this
is characterized by an informal structure with
the key objective of achieving viability. The firm
operates with a simple structure or no structure
at all and all key decisions are made by the
owner or just a few members, and communica-
tion is informal. There are no formal procedures
or written rules at this stage of development
(Greiner 1972; Lester, Parnell, and Carraher
2003; Lippitt and Schmidt 1967; Madhani 2010;
Quinn and Cameron 1983; Scott 1972).
Although all new firms are not necessarily
small when being established, there is a general
assumption by life cycle theorists that the busi-
ness is small in size, informal in structure and
displays potential for efficiency improvements
over time (Greiner 1972; Lester, Parnell, and
Carraher 2003; Lippitt and Schmidt 1967;
Madhani 2010; Quinn and Cameron 1983; Scott
1972). Small businesses have fewer employees,
less customers, and limited scope of operations
when they are generally owned by one owner
or at most, a very few individuals whereas lack
of expertise and resources are common to many
small businesses and therefore act as barriers to
innovation (Cohen and Klepper 1996; Colvin
1999; Damanpour 1992; Schollhammer and
Kuriloff 1979). Research studies, which have
examined whether large or small technology-
based firms are more innovative, have been
ended with controversy. Some studies have
found that large firms provide a number of
advantages due to the technological and R&D
capabilities which they develop over the long
term (Colvin 1999; Damanpour 1992; Kamien
and Schwartz 1982; Kupfer 1998). Conversely,
smaller firms are found to be more innovative
as they are more flexible and as a result, they
have the ability to accept and effect change
(Damanpour 1992). In large firms, communica-
tion and coordination become a difficult task
and hence negatively affect innovation activities
(Damanpour 1992; Gilder 1988). However,
other researchers, such as Quinn and Cameron
(1983) have argued that firms tend to adopt
more innovations during the early stages when
they are small and growing than during their
later stages; the innovation capabilities of firms
gradually decrease, particularly when they
become larger and more formalized business
entities. Here, Doms, Dunne, and Roberts
(1995), however, argue that mature and large
firms attempt to survive by adopting more pro-
cess innovations—producing goods and services
more cheaply and efficiently as they diffuse into
the market.
Govindarajan and Kopalle (2006) found that
a working climate that promotes entrepreneur-
ship, risk-taking, flexibility, and creativity, sup-
ports innovation efforts of employees. Here,
Quinn and Cameron (1983) observed that at the
beginning, the organization is characterized by
risk-taking, flexibility, and entrepreneurship
wherein more emphasis is given for innovation.
The owner becomes the key innovator
(Mintzberg 1973; Smith, Mitchell, and Summer
1985; Van de Ven 1980; West III and Noel
2009), largely because of the centralized
decision-making and the absence of a hierarchy
which frees the entrepreneur to invest in inno-
vation (Miller 1987). The organization focuses
on introducing new products to the market
before its competitors, mirroring the first-mover
strategy discussed by Parnell and Carraher
(2002). Madhani (2010) and Williamson (2000)
state that at the early stages, firms struggle to
attract outstanding employees (Camelo-Ordaz
et al. 2011) wherein innovation insights are
sought from nonexperts or from a few individu-
als who have more familiarity with new technol-
ogies (Abernathy and Utterback 1978).
The second stage is entitled the “survival” or
“collaboration” stage, and as noted by Lester
and Parnell (1999), the informality of the early
stage gives way to a simple structure where the
role of managers is defined and firms attempt to
promote the division of work (Lester, Parnell,
and Carraher 2003). Most firms are character-
ized by functional specialization at this stage
(Scott 1972), although as Quinn and Cameron
(1983) observe, at this stage, collaboration and
teamwork are very much encouraged. This is
particularly a challenge as Lovea and Roper
(2009) argue, especially in supporting cross-
functional research and development teams,
where these were identified as enablers of inno-
vation. When a firm reaches the growth stage,
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more emphasis is placed on acquiring resour-
ces, advanced technologies and expertise (Sir-
mon et al. 2011). At the growth stage, experts
with different knowledge backgrounds are used
to support innovation (Abernathy and Utterback
1978) as different sources of ideas are an impor-
tant determinant of innovation (Akhavan and
Hosseini 2016; Wagner 2013). This may include
formal engineering departments, the creation of
R&D teams, or partnerships with external sour-
ces of knowledge and expertise (Abernathy and
Utterback 1978).
The next stage is labeled as the “success” or
“formalization” stage, and at this point the firm
is mature and develops more formal structures
with written job descriptions, hierarchical
reporting, and clear rules and procedures
(Lester and Parnell 1999; Lester, Parnell, and
Carraher 2003; Madhani 2010; Quinn and
Cameron 1983). Hence, firms become less flexi-
ble. Researchers (Daugherty, Chen, and Ferrin
2011; Sethi and Iqbal 2008) found that there
was a negative relationship between formaliza-
tion and innovation. Lester, Parnell, Crandall,
and Menefee (2008) state that firms that are at
the growth stage attempt to differentiate their
products from competitors through an enhanced
resource base, expertise, and R&D capabilities.
Sirmon et al. (2011) argue that mature firms
seek to hire experienced employees to support
innovation activities at the growth stage. The
fourth stage is identified as the “renewal” stage
by Lester and Parnell (1999), Lester, Parnell,
and Carraher (2003) or as “elaboration” by
Quinn and Cameron (1983). Generally, a matrix-
type structure emerges at this stage. Quinn and
Cameron (1983) argue, at the elaboration stage,
business expansion and decentralization are
given priority. When firms reach the maturity
stage, more attention is given to avoiding risk.
Studies by Miles and Snow (1978) and Lester,
Parnell, and Carraher (2003) argue that the strat-
egy of controlling its market segment becomes
the key focus of the organization as cost control
and production efficiency are considered as nec-
essary conditions for success.
Utterback and Abernathy (1975) found that
at the later stages, firms focus on minimizing
cost as competitive advantage depends on the
ability to reduce cost. However, Sirmon et al.
(2011) argue that this is not the sole focus as
firms attempt to create a balance between inno-
vation and efficiency when in maturity, requir-
ing strategic interventions to reduce the
emergence of bureaucratic forms of operation
which subsequently suppress innovation (Miller
and Friesen 1984). Hence, the allocation of
resources for innovation declines at this stage
(Sirmon et al. 2011). Moore (2000) found that
when firms become mature, they attempt to
develop a fully integrated whole product
through standardization and productization, by
exploiting existing resources and capabilities.
Chiaroni et al. (2010) noted that in the later
stages, networking with external institutions
such as universities is a common practice since
these institutions help them to access specific
scientific and technology-specific knowledge
(Drejer and Jorgensen 2005). Scott and Bruce
(1987) found that firms actively seek new exter-
nal information as they focus on the business
expansion, plant upgrading, and productivity
improvements. Emphasis is then placed on
external social networks as Kijkuit and Ende
(2010) noted. By contrast, Stolwijka et al. (2012)
found that at the early stages of technology life
cycle, firms often rely on the external technol-
ogy sourcing to maximize their market perform-
ance when the internal technology sourcing
becomes the best choice at the later stages.
RDE Framework and Limitations of Life
Cycle-Based Studies
We observed that innovation models which
are based on life cycle theories, incline to a spe-
cific number of stages, and ignore the interac-
tion of organization-specific attributes at
different stages of development. Particularly,
simple and sequential stage theories fail to
investigate the complex and dynamic nature of
organizations and innovation itself (Schroeder
et al. 1989; Wolfe 1994). The literature suggests
that at a certain time, static as well as dynamic
factors are likely to be present and can influence
the business operations. However, existing
innovation models only incorporate either static
or dynamic factor due to the theoretical and
methodological limitations and therefore suffer
from drawbacks in capturing the complexity of
innovations (Wolfe 1994).
Bryson (2008) found that at a certain time,
static, and dynamic factors coexist and indeed
influence organizational activities. She argues
that the practical and conceptual limitations of
organizational dynamics can be overcome by
applying the RDE theoretical framework follow-
ing the theoretical ideas of Williams (1980).
Bryson (2008) found that the RDE framework
helps to capture the organization’s change over
time, and incorporates the past, present, and
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future of the organization while providing a
dynamic as well as a static view of the organiza-
tion. Williams (1980) argues that residual, domi-
nant, and emergent (RDE) constantly interact
with each other. Recently, other researchers in
organization change and management (Devlin
2010; Silver 2009) identified that the RDE model
can be applied in a variety of settings as the
wholeness of the model provides a substantial
and flexible theoretical framework to under-
stand organizational change. Bryson (2008, p.
749), following Williams’s framework, defines
the dominant, residual, and emergent organiza-
tion as follows:
(1) Dominant represents the practices and
beliefs which are organized and lived, that
organization members put energy into
(2) Emergent represents the new practices and
beliefs which are continually being cre-
ated, that may or may not be incorporated
(3) Residual represents the still practiced or
believed residue of earlier life in the orga-
nization that assists in making sense of the
present.
As Bryson (2008) discussed, residual, domi-
nant, and emergent features of organization life
are in a constant struggle. Residual represents
the still active elements of the past and is often
a form of alternative practice to the dominant
[practice] in its most recent forms. The emergent
represents the new practices and beliefs, still in
development, possibly not clearly defined or
articulated, but which are seen as necessary for
future commercial success. Coexisting with new
practices and beliefs are movements and adjust-
ments to existing or “dominant” innovations,
which are also being re-shaped and formed
(Devlin 2010; Williams 1980). In the innovation
management literature, innovation often refers
to new ideas (Van de Ven 1986) which recom-
bine old ideas into new forms, or new ideas that
challenge the present or existing procedures,
order, customs, or routines (Rogers 1983;
Zaltman, Duncan, and Holbek 1973). Here, the
interaction of people over time provides a
period of ferment where the old overlaps with
the new, where dominant ideas or practices are
challenged (Van de Ven 1986), and of course
new ideas will also be challenged by notions of
old practices. The RDE framework argues that a
dominant system may only accommodate alter-
native meanings and values through constant
interaction with residual and the emergent
culture. Thereby it affirms that the acceptance
or rejection of new ideas is a result of the inter-
action between three elements—residual, domi-
nant, and emergent forces. The RDE framework
therefore provides a strong conceptual founda-
tion for innovation studies, especially in terms
of how innovation is influenced by new, exist-
ing, and old ideas. Likewise, a close conceptual
association between the RDE framework and
innovation can be observed when innovation is
viewed as movement and adjustment within the
dominant meanings, values, and practices (Dev-
lin 2010; Williams 1980).
In this study, we therefore, examine the
effects of organizational dynamics on innovation
using the RDE framework as it can assist us to
investigate how residual, dominant, and emer-
gent organizational factors affect the adoption
of innovation. Such an analysis is important for
both practitioners and researchers because the
use of the RDE framework can reveal the inter-
play between organizational development and
innovation, as well as providing an opportunity
to examine both static and dynamic perspectives
within an organization. More importantly, it
assists in overcoming the limitations of life cycle
theories as we can examine the evolutionary
processes of an organization—simultaneously
capturing the past, present and the future of
innovation activities without delimiting its devel-
opment to prescriptive stages as previously
defined in the life cycle theory-based studies.
Methodology
In this study, we used four software compa-
nies in Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka was selected to con-
duct the empirical work because the majority of
industries in Sri Lanka are said to be less com-
petitive and have shown a high failure rate
(Dutz and O’Connell 2013; Herath and Silva
2011). In comparison to other sectors in Sri
Lanka, the software industry has shown a steady
growth despite country specific constraints and
challenges. As such it is now recognized as an
emerging destination for software development
(Kearney 2009; United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development 2012). Consequently,
Sri Lanka and its software industry provide an
ideal setting for exploring the research ques-
tions posed by gaps in existing literature. Data
came from in-depth interviews, annual reports,
archival information, marketing documents,
company websites, and digital media.
UDAGEDARA AND ALLMAN 7
Denzin (1978) notes that the case study is a
comprehensive research strategy that allows a
researcher to use several data sources. Our
research also requires the use of multiple data
sources to understand the interplay between
residual, dominant, and the emergent organiza-
tion within its natural settings. This is particu-
larly appropriate as we focus on analyzing the
challenges, sense-making, and opportunities
arising from past, present and emerging organi-
zation on the innovation outcomes of
technology-based firms. The case study strategy
was therefore identified as the best method to
achieve our research aim. Case study-based
research studies develop theory by combining
existing knowledge with new empirical data
(Yin 2009) and enhance understanding through
theory development, which realizes our
research aim. In addition, the case study strat-
egy allows the investigator to examine the phe-
nomena within its natural settings (Yin 2003),
which was particularly important as we were
asking participants to reflect upon historical
events and contemporary challenges.
The selection of cases was not random. As
discussed by Yin (2009) and Eisenhardt and
Graebner (2007) carefully selected multiple
cases provide more compelling and robust evi-
dence since the findings are expected to repli-
cate within each case. Eisenhardt (1989) argues
that 4–10 cases work well in theory building
studies. In deciding the number of cases and
interviews, we followed the replication logic as
advised by Eisenhardt (1989). Each case in this
study worked as a distinct analytical unit, and
served to build a theory through comparisons
and replications. Following the theoretical sam-
pling logic in case study selection, the research-
ers considered several factors in selecting the
four cases. The organization’s recognition for
innovation served as the basis of selecting each
case. However, we also wanted companies,
which were different in terms of size, growth,
and markets but were similar in terms of their
characteristics at the start-up phase as these
characteristics were perceived to be different
over the life cycle, creating varying challenges
and issues for firms. The four case companies,
which were included in this study, had a wider
recognition for innovation and had started in a
very similar period within the sector, as well as
with similar capacity. This helped us to under-
stand how these firms managed firm level
dynamics and achieved their current status,
while facing relatively similar macro
environmental changes and challenges over
their life cycle. The following four companies
were included and the characteristics of four
firms were as follows:
Company A—was founded in 1999 as a soft-
ware development company in one of the back
rooms of the founders’ residence in Colombo, Sri
Lanka. The founders included husband and wife,
two of their foreign friends, and family members.
The two Sri Lankan born founders had completed
their postgraduate studies in the United States
before they set up the company with friends and
family. The aspiration of the founders eventually
created a leading IT company with a client base
serving Global 2000 companies. The company
provides a wide range of IT disciplines including
outsourcing, mobile application developments,
software testing and assets management, and
developing software products for leading enter-
prise software providers. It has a staff base of
1,200 in the Sri Lankan Development Centre and
over 5,000 staff globally.
Company B—was established in Sri Lanka
in 1999, initially with six employees as Joint
Partnership with a small software company
based in Sweden. The Sri Lankan business part-
ner had studied in Sweden before the firm was
established in Colombo. At present, the com-
pany head office is located in Sweden and it
operates in 60 countries with 2,700 employees
in total. Its Sri Lankan center has a staff of 970.
Company B has won prestigious awards includ-
ing the Customer Value Enhancement Award for
its innovations. The company’s main business
includes service and asset management, manu-
facturing, supply chain software developments.
Company C—is a Sri Lankan software devel-
opment company established with four employ-
ees, with the aim of supplying high-quality
software solutions in 2000. The founder started
the firm after several years working in the
United Kingdom upon the completion of his
postgraduate studies. The company now oper-
ates in the United States, Singapore, India, and
Malaysia, with a staff base of 130. The company
has won several awards, including the prestigi-
ous Red Herring Global Award for its innova-
tions. Currently it caters for the telecom and
financial markets. The company is recognized
for its mobile solution and HR application
innovations.
Company D—is a technology leader in the
provision of e-security and e-payment solutions
to corporates in Sri Lanka. It has a staff base of
45 and was founded in 2000 with three
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employees. The founder had completed his
degree in software engineering at a local univer-
sity and worked for over six years before he
established the company. It is committed to
innovating and implementing world-class IT sol-
utions. The company’s core business includes
secure electronic payments, information systems
security, enterprise automation, and secure per-
sonal documentation. It is recognized as a tech-
nology leader in the banking and information
security domains and it has won several awards
for innovation. These include the National Best
Quality Software Award and the Asia Pacific ICT
Award for innovative mobile banking solutions.
In total, 44 interviews were conducted, and
included founders/senior managers, middle man-
agers, and front-line employees. The inclusion of
all three levels assists in minimizing the possible
bias of participants. Once the agreement to
access the firm was received, the semi-structured
interview protocol was sent to the respondents
to allow them to understand the issues they were
expected to discuss. The interview protocol was
designed to include an initial open question to
establish the participant’s background and relax
the interviewee. Each participant was invited to
talk about their perspectives on and their organi-
zation’s present situation, from which its past
and unfolding future were explored within the
context their effect on the innovation. A series of
potential prompts were used when necessary, to
gain information, and to explore their experien-
ces. All interviews were face-to-face and they
ranged between one and a half hours and two
hours in length. Data were captured by note-
taking as respondents were reluctant to permit
voice recording. All notes taken during the inter-
views were transferred into Microsoft Word
documents and were sent to all interviewees to
ensure their accuracy before analysis.
As retrospective interviews rely on the accu-
rate recall of past events by individuals, several
disadvantages such as incomplete or inaccurate
retrieval may arise. In addition, selective or
biased recall by the interviewees may occur.
This was recognized in advance and triangula-
tion of data helped to check the accuracy of
information provided by respondents. To
reduce the bias that can occur due to selective
or biased recall by the interviewees, initially, all
key senior managers were interviewed. Then,
after the understanding of events from inter-
views, middle- and lower-level managers were
approached. Finally, the researcher interviewed
operational-level software engineers. This
interview procedure helped to reduce the retro-
spective bias as it helps to triangulate data. In
addition, bias from the retrospective account
was reduced as many interviewees had worked
within these firms from their inception. This
means interviewees could recollect events and
support the researcher to capture the dynamics
of innovation influencing factors and innovation
accurately. More importantly, the interview pro-
cess was conducted and assessed on the collec-
tive background as company archives, annual
reports, and organization charts were also used
to triangulate with the interview data to increase
the data validity and reliability of the study.
During data analysis, within case analysis was
performed first as it allowed unique patterns of
each case to be identified and established the
parameters for cross-case analysis (Eisenhardt
1989). Then evidence from all four cases were
corroborated. By doing so, the similarities and
differences of themes and emergent categories
were identified and further explanations were
built. Following, Graebner (2004) and Gilbert
(2005), the construct tables were used to sum-
marize the case evidence, while providing the
selective story descriptions as such approach
was recognized as an effective way to present
data and show the empirical ground of theory.
Findings
Product Innovation Focused
Entrepreneurial Type Organization at the
Start-Up Phase
The analysis of organization residuals shows
that product innovation, strong social relation-
ships, ad hoc tasks, devolved managerial con-
trols, risk-taking behavior, and top-down
innovation focus were the common features in
the early phase of organization life, which con-
firm the entrepreneurial type organization and a
strong innovation focus (see Table 1) as dis-
cussed by Klepper (1996). At the start-up phase,
being small meant all staff knew each other per-
sonally which developed strong social relation-
ships and facilitated an informal working
climate within the firms. Across all four firms an
informal working climate was a common feature
that was seen as crucial in fostering product
innovation activities.
The previous working environment was
very supportive for innovation because all
of us had personal relationships even
UDAGEDARA AND ALLMAN 9
before we joined the company, and every-
one helped each other. The company cul-
ture is now based on teamwork and
collaboration but relationships are some-
what more formal than the past. We have
a different culture now (Senior Manager,
Company C).
During the firm’s start-up phase, a top-down
innovation approach (leader-led innovation)
was the dominant practice. However, when the
firms grew, accumulated learning helped them
to recognize that such an approach limited the
firm’s innovation capacity as the contribution of
front line employees in generating new ideas
was minimal. This previously dominant
approach was no longer valued and saw the
emergence of a culture that stressed the impor-
tance of having a bottom–up strategy to idea
generation.
In the very beginning, most innovative
ideas came from the top but we quickly
learned that it was the wrong approach as
it limited the ideas from front line staff
(Senior Manager, Company D).
Interestingly, the case analysis uncovered
how these firms, operation in the LDCs, learned
at the start-up phase through their global per-
spectives and networks. In the very early
period, a lack of knowledge workers and
required expertise were observed to hamper
innovation, which was seen to be a common
factor within the all four case companies. Dur-
ing this era, however, individuals within the
firms, who have had sufficient international
experience, became the main facilitators of
innovation and crucially the development of
younger and newer staff. Particularly, in these
firms, the international experience became a
key source for innovation at the start-up phase.
Here, the importance of accessibility to the
global knowledge base in supporting the
growth of firms in LDC was revealed.
Before starting this company, Mr “X”
[Owner] had worked in the USA after his
studies. He helped us to learn new ways
of doing things. We didn’t have these per-
spectives nor the practical experience in
the beginning. We all were fresh gradu-
ates at the time the company started (Sen-
ior Manager, Company A).
The direct involvement of the senior leader-
ship team with developers was also identified as
a special feature at the early stage, and this was
found to have a favorable effect on innovation
activities, particularly idea generation and imple-
mentation activities. This is because immediate
feedback and apparent risk-taking behavior
Table 1
Characteristics of Residual Organization Life
Characteristics Company
A B C D
Strong social relationships and top-down innovation
approach
   
Lack of resources and knowledge of advanced
technologies
   
Leaders taking risk and a strong focus on product
innovation
   
Instant feedback and direct involvement of the senior
leadership team with development activities
  
Ad hoc and uncoordinated tasks as a process of
development
   
Significant proportion of staff time deployed toward
new product development—which is valued by the
senior leadership
   
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demonstrated by the senior leadership team
motivated and facilitated the employees in the
implementation of innovation. This practice
gradually declined and disappeared as these
firms grew and matured, reflecting the changing
priorities of senior leaders over time.
You know that managers never take simi-
lar risks like the boss. In those days, we
shared ideas with the boss directly. But
now, we have to go through managers.
So things get delayed and people are frus-
trated (Software Engineer, Company A).
The transition from informal work settings to
formal work settings appeared to create con-
flicts and tensions within the working environ-
ments of these firms. A lack of team effort was
attributable to the dominant working environ-
ment as increased formalities, in comparison to
previous approaches, were later introduced.
Although strong relationships and group cohe-
siveness were seen as the key characteristics of
the early organization life, and indeed in later
stages, they were marginalized against a desire
to formalize processes and reduce variability in
group cohesiveness. When the firms evolved in
size, they introduced substantial changes to
their work ethos, and the senior employees
with long tenure continuously attempted to
maintain their previous work ethos. This behav-
ior created tension between old and new staff,
which were seen as a barrier to innovation.
If I tell you the truth, we really like the
working environment we had in the past
because we worked like a family. Every-
thing was based on friendship. Now this
is quite different. People have become
more selfish and jealous. They do not
think about others as we did in the past.
Such environment does not support team
efforts and implementing new and riskier
things (Senior Manager, Company C)
Although employee freedom was considered
as an essential characteristic of corporate life by
these companies, organization growth demanded
the introduction of managerial controls in both
formal and informal settings to a greater extent.
This led to the dissatisfaction of longer serving
employees, who demonstrated strong resistance
to this changing attitude, which was seen as ham-
pering the innovation efforts inside the firms. In
the early phase of these firms, freedom to
experiment and implement new ideas enabled
the exploration of new products. This practice
was later changed where widespread experimen-
tation was no longer valued as the firms grew in
size and complexity. Many original employees
really valued and appreciated this previous mana-
gerial practice.
Before we had more freedom but now
managers monitor progress. It has some
effects on our job because now we can’t
implement new solutions as we need and
as we did in the past. (Software Engineer,
Company D).
As the firms grew, the span of control
became an issue resulting in more far-reaching
managerial controls being introduced. The
notion of freedom, which was attributed to the
early form of organization life, became an
important emphasis of residual organization life.
These experiences, practices, and meanings
remained as residuals that affected innovation
efforts at the later stages of the organizations’
life cycles. The interplay between residual work-
ing climate and dominant working climate was
explicit and showed the conflicting views
between managers and employees.
You know . . . freedom does not mean
“wild donkey freedom.” We value
employee freedom and innovation but at
the end of the day we have to ensure that
we achieve company goals. Now we have
over 700 people so some rules and proce-
dures are needed. People do not like it
but this is the reality. Actually, they
[employees] had more freedom in the
past but some people misused it (Senior
Manager, Company C).
At the early phase, the organization focused
all of its resources on introducing new products
to the market before its competitors, mirroring
the first-mover strategy as discussed by Parnell
and Carraher (2002). Utterback and Abernathy
(1975) also found that firms at the early stages
focus on developing innovative products to
meet specific market or customer needs, or
invest in maximize the product’s performance.
As the case analysis revealed, all four compa-
nies, at the early stages, had given priority for
adopting product innovation over other three
types of innovation in capturing market
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opportunities and to establish their brand name
in the selected market segments.
In the very beginning, the main focus was
developing new solutions and we did fre-
quent experiments after analysing the
market conditions. We started as a web
developer. Later, we positioned as an
internet software developer. Now we
have specialisations in insurance, finan-
cial and healthcare applications. In com-
parison to the past we now do not try out
new applications because improving our
processes are the most important issue
for the company’s success. But it does not
mean that we have completely given up
on new projects. We still focus on new
market trends and try to cater if things are
within our scope (Senior Manager, Com-
pany A).
As Quinn and Cameron (1983) discuss, the
entrepreneurial emphasis at the start-up phase
often value adaptability, flexibility and creativity
feature as the major characteristics of the organi-
zation. Govindarajan and Kopalle (2006) found
that a working climate that promotes entrepre-
neurship, risk-taking, flexibility, and creativity,
enables innovation and a common feature of
the four firms was that the organization climate
tolerated failures, knowing some may be con-
verted into opportunities. At the start-up phase,
all companies experimented in new product
developments as this was a key strategic focus,
with product failures being a common conse-
quence of this strategy across the four firms.
In the start-up phase, there was no other
option except introducing something new
to the market and being more creative
than our competitors. We first tried to be
a web development firm but it did not
work for us. Later, we focused on object-
oriented software. Actually we tried out
lots of new applications in those days.
Many failed but a few were a success
(Project Manager, Company B).
In the start-up phase, product innovations
were mainly stimulated by market demand for
software solutions. Continued new entrants
increased the rivalry within the industry, conse-
quently selecting the right market segment and
innovating products to match with the need of
clients became a critical process within the
business. The case data showed that to over-
come these challenges, firms relied on product
differentiation strategies, coupled with a niche
market focus that supported the introduction of
new products that were superior to those cur-
rently available in the market.
We were into something that was very
much in demand. But the challenge was,
at the time we started, many innovations
were taking place and many players were
entering to the industry. So we worked
with the idea of product innovation and
experimented on selected software solu-
tions in a subset of industries (Senior
Manager, Company A).
Klepper (1996) states that product innova-
tions become the key strategy for new entrants
to establish themselves in the industry. The
cross-case analysis also confirmed that in the
early stages, the four software firms had intro-
duced various product innovations to respond
the market opportunities and establish them-
selves in the industry. The analysis of residuals
showed that the company gradually introduced
some formalities and controls within the work-
ing environment, which was as expected in the
literature (Quinn and Cameron 1983). These
controls were, however, identified by employ-
ees as barrier to innovation at the later stages.
Teamwork, People and Process
Innovation Oriented Working
Environment as the Dominant Focus at
the Growth Stage
The analysis of dominant organization char-
acteristics showed that within all the four com-
panies, innovation, team work, and creativity
were valued as the key attributes of dominant
working environments, which shaped members’
behavior while constituting the dominant work-
ing ethos. As cross-case analysis confirmed, cer-
tain managerial controls were gradually
introduced at the growth stage, and this had a
negative effect on interpersonal relationships
among employees. As a result, the senior man-
agement promoted teamwork, trust, and collab-
oration among employees, as these ingredients
were accepted as vital for innovation. However,
increasing tension and competitiveness among
employees were also evident and this appeared
to hamper the free exchange of ideas and infor-
mation. The promotion of teamwork and open-
ness as core values were found to be associated
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with the growth phase, whereby senior manage-
ment had to make extra efforts to promote
them. Efforts to preserve the residual work
ethos were also seen and showed the struggle
between residual and dominant working envi-
ronments. A software engineer from Company
B explained the core value of their working
culture:
Creativity, openness and team spirit are
the core elements of our company’s work-
ing culture. Innovation is in every thought
and act of our people. Learning and
exploring innovations forms a way of life
in the company.
A senior manager from Company B
explained why they had to promote these
values:
Although the working environment is
now somewhat formal, we still want to
work like a family. In the past mutual
understanding was very strong among all
of us but new guys do not trust each other
and no one is ready to take on the major
responsibilities. They do not share their
knowledge with colleagues, possibly
believing that retaining some knowledge
may support their own career. This injects
some bad values into the company cul-
ture, although we try not to allow them to
do so.
As Van de Ven (1986) discussed, innovation
is a result of the development and implementa-
tion of new ideas by people who over time
engage in transactions with others within an
institutional order. The cross-case analysis
revealed that innovation processes were increas-
ingly characterized by centralized research, idea
generation and implementation activities at the
early stages, mainly due to the lack of technol-
ogy capabilities. However, as the firms grew,
with their enhanced technological capabilities,
the innovation process was increasingly focused
toward front line employees, requiring greater
engagement in idea generation and implementa-
tion activities.
In the very beginning, all ideas came from
the head office. Our job was to follow the
instructions and it really did not work for
the company. Many projects failed.
Because we did not have the required
experience and no one showed positive
attitudes to the taking of risk. So they had
to encourage people to take risk and work
independently. Now we have the chance
to plan and do what we feel is good. This
practice is very effective as it helps to get
everybody involved in the process. You
know . . . innovation does not come from
one head, it comes from many heads (Pro-
ject Manager, Company B).
Once organizations passed through this stage,
they began to look for the right people to sustain
the growth already achieved. When these four
firms reached the growth stage, more emphasis
was thus placed on human resource develop-
ment and leaders attempted to develop specific
employee capabilities, all designed to support
the successful implementation of innovation.
Experts with different knowledge and back-
grounds were used to support innovation. The
case data showed that the lack of diverse skills
and expertise were common in the early stages.
We invest in developing our people
because without them how would we
expect to deliver innovation? They should
be equipped with the latest technologies
and be able to handle complex develop-
ments (Business Analyst, Company C).
A common feature of all these firms is that
developing human resources, bottom-up inno-
vation, teamwork, and process improvements
became the dominant attributes of day to day
life at the growth stage (Table 2). As cross-case
analysis confirmed, the dominant working envi-
ronments of firms emphasized process improve-
ments and the competencies of employees
aimed at reducing process inefficiencies and the
time to market. Unsurprisingly, this emphasis
was found to have a favorable effect on process
innovation activities during the growth phase.
Short business cycles, a quick response to
new requests, and reduced time to market
are the mandatory requirements in this
field. So that improving process through
the agile approach is the main emphasis
in our working life now (Business Ana-
lyst, Company C).
As Utterback and Abernathy (1975) found, at
the growth stage, the adoption of process
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innovation is given a priority as firms attempt to
differentiate their existing products from those
of their rivals rather than creating new products,
here process improvements assisted in meeting
increasing market demand. Hence the focus is
on exploring methods that support process
improvement. A similar situation was evident
within the case companies, as process innova-
tion was seen to have become the dominant
focus, which was stimulated by the emphasis on
reducing costs and time to market.
We have to cope with competition, pro-
cess inefficiencies, cost and delivery time,
if we want to succeed. These have
become the key emphasis of the working
culture now, which generally demands
improvement of process (Senior Manager,
Company B).
The evidence suggested that implementation
issues, high cost, and increasing product deliv-
ery time were the major concerns of the domi-
nant cultures of these firms that supported the
adoption of process innovation at the growth
stage. Process innovations supported them in
delivering higher value to customers. The appli-
cation of advanced technology to support
standardizing products is critical because of the
increasing demand and competition which
forces the firms to innovate in process terms,
and increase their output while differentiating
their offerings.
In the early days, we gave priority for
developing new applications but now we
try to improve the agility of applications,
delivery time and meet increasing
demand. So the focus is on the technical
aspects rather than experimenting with
new applications and the main concern is
on innovating process elements. Although
it is mainly used in manufacturing indus-
tries, “Platforming” is the method that we
use to develop our applications (Project
Manager, Company A).
At the growth stage, four firms attempted to
enhance their resource base and expertise to
explore ways to differentiate their products from
competitors through enhanced process efficien-
cies. One noticeable observation was, at the
early stages, a lack of resources, particularly
advanced technologies and capabilities had
appeared as consistent barriers for adopting pro-
cess innovations. This suggested that innovating
Table 2
Characteristics of Dominant Organization life
Characteristics Company
A B C D
A focus on openness and clustered teamwork dynamics.    
Promotes a bottom-up innovation approach.    
Less direct involvement with technical development activities by
senior leaders.
  
Increasing introduction of managerial controls and boundaries   
Increasing emphasis on a customer focus (offer/service)    
Systemic interpersonal relationships reducing in importance and
frequency
   
More prescriptive and formalized development of people and
process improvements.
   
Increasing internal tension and competitiveness between sub-
groups/teams.
  
Lack of flexible working hours and arrangements (increasing task
focus).
   
Increasing inequality in the perceived potential contributions
between new and old colleagues.
  
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process was a more complex and difficult task in
comparison to innovating products, presumably
as it required different expertise and the deploy-
ment of advanced processing technologies
which often developed and externally sourced.
Fifteen years ago, we all were new to the
field. So we tried out the things that we
could do better and did not try more com-
plex projects since we didn’t have experts
like we do now. Providing the best solu-
tions to clients’ basic needs with basic
technologies was the challenge that we
had. Now we have good demand for our
products and need to improve the quality
and standards to match with new technol-
ogies. Providing products in a flexible,
cost-effective, and timely manner is the
key to our success now. That is why we
focus on improving our development pro-
cess and invest in deepening our
technology-specific knowledge to meet
the specific needs of clients in our present
markets (Senior Manager, Company A).
The case analysis revealed that different
types of innovation coexisted and were related,
but one type became dominant over other types
in a certain time when the strategic priorities of
firms changed. In the early period, break-
through software solutions became the key
focus, which changed later when the firms
focused on advanced technologies to introduce
incremental innovations. The analysis of resid-
ual and dominant innovation foci revealed how
process innovations affected product innova-
tion, illustrating an association and interdepend-
ency between them—although process
innovation became the dominant focus at the
growth phase.
We have introduced a number of break-
through software solutions and they have
well established in the market. Now it is
not the right time to try out completely
new solutions but to do some incremental
changes to the existing solutions using
new technologies because software inno-
vation is always transformational (Senior
Consultant, Company D)
When the four firms reached the growth
stage, the acquisition of advanced technologies
became a key priority. This was because they
believed that process innovation could be
achieved only through technology-specific
knowledge acquisition. The leadership of the
four firms believed that many of their competi-
tors had a greater knowledge in improving
organizational efficiencies, reducing cost, and
were equipped with more advanced technolo-
gies than them. Hence, investing in enhancing
their resource base and expertise, particularly
obtaining advanced technological capabilities
were viewed as a strategic priority. Here, Cohen
and Levinthal (1990) found that individual firms
were expected to invest in acquiring scientific
capabilities, and this was a principal competitive
factor in contributing to the firm’s success. This
was observed within the four businesses, where
include technical expertise and deep industry
knowledge were sought at the growth phase.
Control Oriented Hierarchical
Organization and Organizational
Innovation as Emergent
The analysis of emerging organizations
revealed that a great deal of emphasis on work-
place organization, which involved the imple-
mentation of new methods for distributing
responsibilities and decision making, appeared
within the four case companies. In the early
period, employees enjoyed greater autonomy in
decision-making, which facilitated new ideas,
but this situation changed later on when the
firms grew in size and new external relation-
ships were sought. A strong emphasis on organ-
izational innovations gradually emerged at this
stage, consequently emphasis for product and
process innovations gradually declined.
We expect to make some changes to the
structure. Now we have 4 levels and it will
increase to 5. Management will get more
power, responsibilities and autonomy
than now, but lower organisational
employees will get less autonomy because
giving more power and autonomy to man-
agement is really essential if we want to
increase efficiency, and strengthen exter-
nal partnerships (Senior Manager, Com-
pany A)
The cross-case analysis showed, the emer-
gent organization was characterized by increas-
ing efficiency focused, professionalism, and
business expansion, which eventually appeared
to support the adoption of organizational inno-
vation (Table 3). The emergence of new mana-
gerial controls and additional layers to their
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organization structures were observed when all
the four firms highlighted the importance of
implementing new organizational methods and
business practices. The analysis of emergent
organization practice indicted that the four firms
planned to introduce new structures to effec-
tively connect all sections of the organizations,
with the aim of enhancing coordination and
effective communication. This revealed that
coordination and communication became an
important issue when firms grew in size and
when they were looking for new and stronger
external relationships—with customers, suppli-
ers, trade organizations, etc.
We have a performance-oriented working
culture. People, who perform, excel here,
but still we need to find innovative ways
to get the best out of them as we plan to
develop partnerships with key players in
the industry. So several structural changes
and professional practices are expected to
be introduced (Senior Business Executive,
Company B).
A respondent of Company A, a senior-level
executive, stated:
We plan to introduce some changes to
our business structure. It will be com-
pletely different from what we have now.
We want to introduce these changes to
the business structure to improve the
coordination of centres and reduce opera-
tional costs. When coordination is weaker
it delays implementation and increases
cost.
A similar situation was reported at Com-
pany D.
We have daily team meetings but the com-
pany wants to have regular meetings with other
teams like sales and products so we plan to
introduce a matrix type structure.
The emergent organization supported the
adoption of organizational innovation over
other types as there was a strong tendency to
improve internal communication efficiency and
productivity by adopting new organizational
practices. These new systems were seen as the
key to enabling them to evolve into big corpora-
tions. One reason identified for such a control
focus was the increasing tension among employ-
ees as team sizes increased, which appeared to
create personality clashes and poor working
relationships. This environment appeared to
inhibit idea generation.
Before we had small development teams
and it worked well for us. We now have
large development teams. If I tell you the
truth, people now do not share their
views freely like they did before. Because
they have all got different backgrounds
and they show a little tolerance for others’
view. This may be more adverse in the
future as the company plans to increase
team size and implement new systems
and procedures to minimise conflicts and
issues of project teams (Senior Manager,
Company B).
Table 3
Characteristics of Emergent Organization Life
Characteristics Company
A B C D
Professionalism demanded in, and across, activities, and functions   
Emphasis on business expansion and developing strategic
partnerships
  
Enforcement of strong managerial controls   
Focus on adding new layers to existing organization structure(s)    
Increasing emphasis on internal efficiency improvements   
Higher employee turnover, standardization, and monitoring perform-
ance increasingly feature.
  
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Increasing managerial controls appeared to
be a contributory factor to higher employee
turnover as growth accelerated. This was com-
pounded by a shortage of qualified labor in the
LDCs which required companies to recruit less
qualified employees despite often articulated
reservations by existing employees. The case
data revealed that existing staff disliked this
decision because they believed that this strategy
could affect the quality of software solutions
and their working life.
Every day people are leaving because no
one likes too much control. They are
going to recruit diploma holders. It will
really affect the quality of developments
and our work (Software Engineer, Com-
pany A).
A senior manager from Company A
explained the labor issues they faced.
We need more people to meet our current
demand but recruiting graduates is a big
issue now since we do not have enough
talent in the labour market. The industry
has grown very fast. So we have to look
for alternative talents and solutions.
Changes to organizational structure were
inevitable with an increasing size when the
emergent organization was expected to be more
formal. As noted by Cameron and Quinn (1999),
this is not uncommon as firms often tend to
introduce rigid systems and procedures in simi-
lar scenarios, to enable them to control their
operations, people, and resources more effec-
tively. As a result, the emerging organizations
appear to enable the organizational innovations
over other three types to exploit the external
opportunities and internal capabilities.
Discussion
Theoretical Implications
As this research was conducted in the soft-
ware industry in Sri Lanka, with organizations
that had a similar age—growing and maturing—
the domain in which this theory applies is of
course limited to similar organizations. Nonethe-
less, the study shows how technology-based
small firms evolve and adopt innovations to
achieve their business objectives over time. As
concerns the first contribution, the study estab-
lished that the residual and the emergent
organization have a significant impact on the
firms’ innovation focus—the dominant form.
The use of the RDE framework permitted us to
uncover the tension between past, present and
emerging organizational dynamics and the
changing innovation focus of these firms.
The research conducted under the antecedent
approach blindly assumes that the factors influ-
encing innovation are not changed, and ignore
the effect of time, thus the limitation of predict-
ability of future innovation performance is
inherent in these models. Floricel and Dough-
erty (2007) noted that life cycle theories applied
to investigate innovation have limited predictive
power due to too restrictive and unrealistic
assumptions. By applying the RDE framework,
we found that the dynamic nature of static mod-
els can be enhanced as considerations of the
RDE provides a picture of the organization’s
past, present, and future at a certain time, thus
facilitating the understanding of the changing
nature of innovation and influencing factors
over time. The use of RDE framework facilitated
in this study to understand both static and
dynamic perspectives within organizations as
well as evolving nature of technology and orga-
nization while revealing the interrelatedness of
innovations. As for the next contribution, we
found that the innovation focus of software
firms follows a pattern of product-process-
organizational innovation, by which we confirm
and extend the findings of Utterback and Aber-
nathy (1975). We also acknowledge, as dis-
cussed by Linton and Walsh (2003), product
and process innovations are interrelated, and a
change in process can lead to a change in prod-
uct. This is because, as we found, although dif-
ferent types of innovations coexist, and are
correlated to each other, one becomes dominant
over other types at a particular time when the
firms’ strategic priorities change. We observed,
at the start-up phase, the firms focused on intro-
ducing various types of product innovations to
selected market segments—some of these inno-
vations fail and others establish in the market.
At this stage, the firms use cheaper technolo-
gies, more readily available capabilities and
well-known approaches in the industry to
develop software solutions that are configured
to be new into the market. In the early period,
technology change is relatively limited and does
not feature capital-intensive or high-quality
technologies.
The desire to preserve the entrepreneurial
type working environment and product
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innovation was seen as a strong theme and this
was found to have a negative effect on process
innovation activities as organization members
tend to appreciate residual organizational prac-
tices and the previous product innovation focus.
For example, the informal working environ-
ment, which has a favorable effect on product
innovation in the early stages of organizational
development, was observed to have a negative
effect on innovation activities in the later stages.
Moreover, with the growing maturity of firms, a
hierarchical control–oriented organization
emerges as discussed by Lester, Parnell, and
Carraher (2003), and has a negative impact on
employee propensity to innovate due to reduced
risk-taking and an increasing reluctance to
endure failure. We found that when the firms
were small in size, it enabled a working climate
of very strong professional and personal ties;
these were consistently open and encouraging
relationships which encouraged innovation
efforts. However, when the firms grew in size,
more formal working environments and mana-
gerial controls were introduced and conse-
quently these types of relationships were
weakened—despite attempts to moderate this.
We further noted that when the firms were
small in size, it assisted more effective feedback
and communication. In particular, instant feed-
back and the direct involvement of the senior
leadership team in supporting the implementa-
tion of innovation appeared to reduce lead
times in comparison to more emergent practice
as the firms grew in size. Delayed feedback and
less direct involvement of the senior leadership
team with innovation activities at the later stages
appeared to contribute to more protracted inno-
vation outcomes and poorer employee engage-
ment in the process. Our findings suggest, at
the later stages, the firms pay less attention to
introducing breakthrough product innovations
as the emphasis switches from product to pro-
cess, and later on to organizational innovation.
Here, the organization’s environment is re-
shaped from an entrepreneurial to a hierarchical
type over time. As a result, there appeared to be
a constant struggle among dominant, residual,
and emergent practices that lead to a tension
among old and new employees. First, these
findings are important as they indicate the vary-
ing effect of innovation influencing factors at
different stages of the corporate life cycle. Sec-
ond, this reveals the effect of static and dynamic
elements on innovation activities. Third, such
findings emphasize the importance of analyzing
central-dominant practices as well as emergent
and residual practices in developing innovation
friendly working environments.
As Koplyay, Chillingworth, and Mitchell
(2013) discuss, at the growth stage, the software
firms also continuously invest in adopting differ-
ent type of process innovations including new
technologies, methodologies, and skills. These,
for example, included agile software develop-
ment, which has a direct influence on process
efficiency—reducing the time to market and
development costs. As Pyka (2000) argues, the
willingness to invest in product innovation is
more influenced by the market conditions or
types of demand at the early stages of the firm’s
development. Later, sectoral technology
advancements within the industry appear to
require new skills and knowledge to reduce
costs and the time to market of later versions of
applications etc. Interestingly, this shows the
interdependent nature of market pull and tech-
nology push perspectives, which may have
implications for the switching from product to
process innovation. At the growth stage, the
firms do not attempt to introduce breakthrough
software solutions as they focus on improving
and upgrading established software products in
the market, and the management of projects.
When the focus shifts to the process innova-
tions, the firms invest in acquiring new process
specific technological capabilities, process spe-
cific R&D activities, new project management
skills, and advanced technologies. The organiza-
tion environment constantly stimulates new
ideas related to process innovations, possibly at
the expense of other types of innovations. Anal-
ysis here shows the process focused innovation
emphasis appears to change in the next phase
as the businesses evolves into streamlining the
work process and strengthening the power of
managerial positions emerges as a necessary
condition when the firms further grow in size.
At the next level of their development, the span
of control and the management of external rela-
tionships becomes as key issue whereby the
organizational innovation emerges as a key stra-
tegic priority. To achieve this, new organiza-
tional methods in the firm’s business practices,
workplace and external relations are sought,
increasing operational efficiencies and further
exploiting existing capabilities by reconfiguring
the organizational structure and administrative
systems are given significant priority. As a
result, further explorations of product and pro-
cess innovations starts to decline.
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This study also demonstrates how firms in
LDCs manage and develop technological capa-
bilities over time and overcome the resource
barriers. As other studies (e.g., Bessant 2003;
Simmons and Sower 2012; Williams and
Woodson 2012) revealed, we also found that
the lack of resources became a key barrier to
adopting innovations. In the early period of
their development, the four software firms had
acquired technological capabilities by network-
ing with the organizations in developed coun-
tries through individuals in the firms or through
joint venture partnerships. The study uncovered
that at the start-up phase, founders with interna-
tional experience or international connections
became the main innovation source or protago-
nist for the firms in LDCs. Later, they develop
their technology capabilities, integrating exter-
nal knowledge with in-house efforts, and inves-
ting in R&D activities and human capital
development. As the mature they gradually
upgrade their knowledge through technology
suppliers, clients, and local research institutions
such as universities, which particularly support
the process innovation activities at the mid-
stage. This shows, although the external sources
of knowledge play an important role, the firm’s
ability to create and develop their own innova-
tion capabilities is a key factor that contributes
innovation success in LDCs. We noted, the lack
of advanced technological capabilities influ-
enced the firms in focusing on a narrow subset
of products within their sector to satisfy current
and future clients by introducing product inno-
vations with the minimum technology capabil-
ities they possess in the early stages. Within a
LDC, this strategy seems to have worked well as
the users of technology are ready to accept the
new technology products, which satisfy the min-
imum performance threshold as they also do
not have the ability to use advanced technologi-
cal solutions either. Later, this situation changes
when both groups—the users and the firms
enhance technological capabilities resulting in
buyers expecting improvements in technologies,
product performances, the time to market, and
all this at lower cost. Firms at the growth stages
consequently focus on adopting process innova-
tion and enhancing their technological capabil-
ities through external and internal sources. The
findings of this assist in understand how tech-
nology innovation evolves in an industry over
time in a LDC context. In addition, tensions
between the longest serving newest employees
and the emerging hierarchical organization
contribute to increasing employee turnover.
At the same time, these firms struggle to
recruit new employees, particularly process
and organizational innovation champions to
support the businesses growing needs. In an
LDC, this human resource issue appears to
become a key challenge that knowledge-
intensive industries face due to the resource
constrains and the increasing competitive
nature of the sector.
In this study, we have adopted Van de Ven’s
(1986) definition as it stresses the importance of
inputs as well as outputs of the innovation pro-
cess. As a result, we revealed how the organiza-
tional environment supports three innovation
foci over the organization life cycle. Figure 1
shows that the start-up phases of these firms are
characterized by an entrepreneurial type organi-
zational environment, which encourages and
embraces informality and uncertainty, this
appears to provide the necessary conditions for
producing innovative products. The organiza-
tion then enters a transition phase, where the
strategic organizational focus shifts to process
innovation investments, which requires increas-
ing formality and more defined team-based
working. At the cross-over point there appears
to be an increasing tension within the organiza-
tion working environment. As the team- and
people-focused working environment becomes
dominant, the organization changes to support
perceived organizational forms that accommo-
date process innovations, and in particular pro-
cess efficiency. Over time, the firms move
toward identifying competitive gains through
organizational efficiency. This shift or transition
again appears to create organizational tension.
What emerges is a more hierarchical organiza-
tion that focuses resources for organizational
innovation. Our findings therefore extend the
views of Utterback and Abernathy (1975) and
Damanpour and Gopalakrishnan (2001) who
identified the product-process innovation pat-
tern evolution of the firm. Utterback and Aber-
nathy also argued, at the third stage, firms
attempt to have a balance between product and
process innovation. However, as we found,
organizational innovation becomes a key strate-
gic priority and incremental adjustments in
products and process innovations are focused
on over this period.
Practical Implications
In terms of practical implications, this research
illustrates to organizations the hard and soft
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challenges they face around technology and sys-
tems, and organizational climate and form. Resul-
tantly, our proposed theory accommodates
residual, dominant, and emergent organizational
working environments, and crucially product-
process-organizational innovation foci. This
approach has revealed two interweaved chal-
lenges for managers of organizations. First, initial
organizational forms, described as entrepreneurial
type, support product innovation strategies, but
appear that they may not necessarily support pro-
cess or organizational innovation. Consequently,
senior executives have to consider a number of
complex and interrelated components, such as
new knowledge, skills, resources, organizational
form, rewards, and cohesion, often in the context
of growth—including generating new sales, new
market territories, and new staff. Our findings
also guide the small businesses as the analysis of
RDE framework uncover the business life cycle of
entrepreneurial firms which generally start as a
small firm and draw the attention to the need for
awareness of the changing role of innovation and
management when the firms grow. Practitioners
can therefore use the RDE framework to better
anticipate the future innovation characteristics
and organizational forms that can best support
innovation, while being mindful of periods of ten-
sion that they can experience when organizations
transit from one stage to another stage.
This study emphasizes the importance of dif-
ferent types of innovation at different stages of
the organization’s development to achieve
corporate objectives. Moreover, bringing the
organization into being, building a credible
product, was the primary performance objec-
tives at the start-up phase. Process innovation
supported the achievement of market-related
performance objectives such as decreasing
delivery time and increasing product quality
which were in evidence at the growth stage. As
we observed, undesirable residuals and less
innovative friendly emerging factors coexisted
with the dominant innovation influencing fac-
tors. As a result of this, practitioners should
scan the residual, dominant, and emergent
innovation influencing factors to develop more
innovative friendly working environments—
particularly as the organization shifts from one
focus to another. In this case, the analysis of
RDE organizations, when combined with the
identified characteristics of this study (Tables
1–3), can therefore be used to better under-
stand the environmental context that can facili-
tate innovation.
Conclusion
The study introduces a novel theoretical
framework for innovation management that
Figure 1
Organizational Dynamics and Innovation Focus
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supports better understanding of the organiza-
tional dynamics and innovation foci. This study
has shown that innovation models, which are
based on the static life cycle theories, can be
improved by accommodating dynamic perspec-
tives. In this study, this was demonstrated by
applying the RDE theoretical framework. The
RDE framework provided a picture of the
organization’s past, present, and the future
while enabling a necessary theoretical founda-
tion for analyzing both the changing nature of
innovation focus and the organization over
time. More importantly, this study demonstrated
the varying effect of innovation influencing
characteristics at different stages of the organiza-
tion development in a LDC—the characteristics
favorable for innovation at the start-up phase
appear not to necessarily support innovation at
later organizational stages. Hence, the RDE
framework provides an appropriate lens for
both academics and practitioners, in identifying
the enablers and barriers of innovation, and the
future innovation challenges. This study has
shown that the different types of innovation
coexist, and are related to each other but the
innovation focus takes the form of a product-
process-organizational pattern over time as the
dominant innovation focus changes in line with
the strategic priorities of firms. This was
coupled with an organizational form that trans-
formed from an entrepreneurial type to a
hierarchical-control oriented firm. The study
also demonstrated that the achievement of cor-
porate performance objectives is supported by
different types of innovation when the appropri-
ate working environment is developed, and
when the organizations’ leadership facilitates
innovation efforts of employees by providing
the opportunities for acquiring technological
capabilities. We found that the firms acquire the
necessary technological capabilities through
international networks, which showcase the
knowledge acquisition strategy of the firms
within a LDC. The study also revealed that the
success of technology-based start-up in an LDC
appears to be greatly determined by the owner’s
education background and the ability to access
the global networks. This obviously has implica-
tions for policy makers in LDCs that are looking
to cultivate particular industries.
This study was mainly based on the founda-
tion of the antecedent approach to innovation
research. Generally, this approach is criticized
for its static orientation and neglecting the vary-
ing effects of innovation influencing factors over
time. In this research, this issue was addressed
by analyzing both static and dynamic factors
through the RDE framework. We acknowledge
that determinants of innovation may interact,
and while the exact nature of interaction cannot
be fully revealed, the analysis of the case studies
and the application of the RDE framework
helped in this study to identify the interaction of
determinants to a greater extent. However, fur-
ther empirical investigations are necessary to
validate the findings of this study as the identi-
fied characteristics and results of this study are
limited to the software industry in Sri Lanka;
therefore, further research in other industries
and similar LDCs are suggested. Although the
present study acknowledges the effect of envi-
ronmental factors on innovation, these factors
were not investigated as the aim of the research
was to identify the effect of organizational level
dynamics on innovation focus. We, therefore,
suggest the use of RDE framework to develop a
more holistic model including both firm level
factors and macro level factors to examine the
evolution of small firms and innovation. More-
over, further research can be conducted to
examine the relationship between innovation
types and the RDE factors identified in this
study using a quantitative research approach.
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